摘要
本文通过构造一种三阶段动态博弈模型,对军事威逼行为进行了形式化分析,得出了在完全信息条件下军事威逼现象不会出现的结论;基于对挑战者与威慑者双边不完全信息条件下军事威逼模型博弈均衡的求解,探讨了军事威逼成功应满足的条件。
The paper conducts a formal analysis of eompellence in military affairs, and concludes that the compellence phenomenon can not occur in complete information. The game equilibriums of the eompellenee model with incomplete information of both challenger and the deterer are computed,and the conditions of successful eompellenee are studied.
出处
《运筹与管理》
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第1期5-8,共4页
Operations Research and Management Science
关键词
威逼
威慑
博弈均衡
不完全信息
compellence
deterrence
incomplete information
game equilibrium
