考虑公平偏好的委托模式融通仓银行对3PL激励

The Incentive Mechanism of Banks to 3PL considering the factor of Justice Preference Based on FTW of Principal-Agent Mode

第三方物流(Third party logistics,3PL)努力工作和积极参与是融通仓有效运作的重要因素,因此促使其努力工作是一个非常重要的问题。本文在传统委托代理模型中加入"公平偏好"因素,并从是否考虑"公平偏好"因素两个方面,研究银行对3PL的激励问题。研究发现,考虑"公平偏好"因素后,银行给3PL的固定报酬高于传统委托代理模型中最优固定支付时,3PL会在最优努力程度上再增加一定数量的额外努力以回报银行的善意,且3PL"公平偏好"行为越强,增加的努力数量就越多,从而使银行收益高于传统委托代理模型中3PL选择最优努力水平时的收益。本文意义在于银行可以根据3PL"公平偏好"的强弱,合理设计报酬机制,以进一步增加自身收益。

3PL＇s working bard and actively participating in the activity is the key factor of FTW operating effectively, so it is a quite important question to make 3PL work hard. This paper adds justice preference to traditional principal-agent mode, and then from two aspects that whether considers justice preference or not, it studies the incentive mechanism of banks to 3PL. The result shows that considering the factor of justice preference, 3PL will increase some extra effort on the basis of best value in return, when banks give higher reward to 3PL, and the stronger the sense of justice preference is, the more 3PL increases extra effort, in this way, banks benefit more eompared with the profit in traditional principal-agent mode. The significance of the research lies in that banks design the reasonable reward mechanism according to the situation of 3PL, in order to increase own profit.