风险投资中的证券设计:转换权与清算权

Security Design in Venture Capital Financing: Conversion and Liquidation Right

本文在不完全合约的背景下,研究了风险投资中的证券设计问题,风险投资家持有可转换债券,而创业者持有普通股。本文考察了两种定约情形,第一种是创业者向风险投资家提供合约,合约双方存在一个再谈判博弈;第二种是风险投资家向创业者提供合约,存在一个双方前后相继行动的动态博弈。本文分析了这两个博弈,设计了能够诱导合约双方最优努力的可转换债券,刻画了风险投资家如何监控项目、配置权利与放弃低值项目的风险投资合约特点。

Based on incomplete theory, this paper studies the problem of security design in venture capital financing. The venture capitalist （VC） holds convertible bond, and the entrepreneur holds common stocks. This paper analyzes two contracting situation. Firstly, the entrepreneur offers a contract to the VC, and there exists a renegofiafion game between the two parties. Secondly, the venture capitalist offers contract to VC, and this leads to a dynamic game that both parties take actions one after another. The paper analyzes the two games and proposes a convertible stock that can lead to the best efforts of both parties, and shows how the VC to monitor the project, to allocate the rights and to give up bad project.