国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素研究

On the Incentive Effects of SOE Tournament

本文尝试从锦标赛的角度为国企竞争理论提供信息经济学模型解释和实证支持。为了达到这一目的，本文从政府干预和共同代理的角度对经典的锦标赛模型进行细化和拓展，以揭示出国企锦标赛激励效应与制约因素，并收集2451家地方国有上市公司披露的薪酬差距数据对理论模型进行实证检验。理论模型表明，薪酬差距的扩大和国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛激励的强化会增加国企经营者的努力水平，因而有利于公司绩效的提升。不过，国企经营者赢得经济锦标赛的激励却受到政府行政干预和共同代理问题的制约。实证结果表明，我国地方国有上市公司薪酬差距与公司绩效显著正相关，而与地方政府行政干预和共同代理问题的严重程度显著负相关，从而支持了理论模型。

This paper studies the performance of SOE executives from the perspective of tournament incentives. Our theoretic model suggests that larger degree of payoff dispersion leads to more managerial efforts and thus better performances. However, government interventions and common agent problem negatively affect the tournament incentives. We test the theory with the salary data of 2 451 listed SOE companies of China. The results do support the theory.