期刊文献+

信息不对称对PE在中国发展的影响 被引量:1

Influence of Information Asymmetry on Private Equity Investment's Development in China
原文传递
导出
摘要 首先用博弈论对PE和企业双方博弈的情况进行了探讨,通过博弈模型分析认为,企业和PE双方间的信息不对称问题可以造成PE投资决策错误的可能,但模型不能涵盖所有情况;其次,PE、代理和企业三方博弈存在两类情况,信息不对称是代理牟取利益的核心因素;最后,提出PE在中国发展的相关建议。 theory, the model'can forwarding The paper firstly discusses game condition between PE and enterprises based on the game conclusion is the problem may induce PE's wrong decision-making, but the game analysis not cover all instances. Then, the paper considers there are two kinds of game among PE, corporations and enterprises, and information asymmetry is the core element of obtaining benefits of forwarding corporation. Lastly, the paper presents corresponding advice which is in favor of PE's development in China.
出处 《情报科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期257-259,304,共4页 Information Science
关键词 信息不对称 私募股权 信号博弈 information asymmetry private equity signal game
  • 相关文献

参考文献5

二级参考文献6

  • 1张极井.项目融资[M].北京:中信出版社,1995..
  • 2[美]保罗·A·冈珀斯 乔希·勒纳著.宋晓东等译.风险投资周期[M].北京:经济科学出版社,2002.111-121.
  • 3中国风险投资研完院.2006中国风险投资年鉴.北京:民主与建设出版社,p125—129.
  • 4Gompers, Paul A. and Josh Lerner, "The Use of Covenants:An Empirical Analysis of Venture Partnership Agreements, " Journal of Law and Economics, 39 (October 1996) , p.566-599.
  • 5Kaplan, Steven N. and Per Stromberg.."Venture Capitalists as Principals: Contracting, Screening, and Monitoring".NBER working paper, 2003, No.8202.
  • 6Lin, T,H. and Richard L. Smith, "Insider Reputation and Selling Decisions: The Unwinding of Venture Capital Investments During Equity IPOs, " unpublished working paper,Arlzona State University, 1995.

共引文献11

同被引文献5

引证文献1

二级引证文献3

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部