摘要
分析了关系契约的特征,构建了水利工程中政府与代建单位间的关系激励契约,讨论了政府与代建单位间基于关系契约的奖金机制及其影响因素,并探讨了关系激励契约的管理。研究表明关系契约中最优奖金决定于政府对双方关系未来价值的评价和代建市场行情等因素;政府可根据代建市场行情来管理与代建单位间的关系激励契约,代建市场行情好时政府更应该提高对双方合作关系的评价、注重建立良好的声誉,以赢得更好的代建服务。
This paper analyzes the features of relational contract, constructs the relational motivation contracts, discusses the reward mechanism and its influencing factors between government and construction agent, and explores the management on relational motivation contracts. The results show that the optimal reward is dependent on several factors, such as how government values the future relation with construction agent, and market situation of construction agency. The government can manage the relational incentive contracts with construction agent according to market situation. When the situation is good, government should enhance evaluation of the cooperation, and pay much attention to building up good reputation as to get better construction agency service.
出处
《建筑经济》
2010年第3期76-79,共4页
Construction Economy
基金
"十一五"国家科技支撑计划重大项目"南水北调工程若干关键技术研究与应用"(2006BAB04A13)
关键词
代建制
激励机制
关系激励契约
自我实施约束
construction agent system incentive mechanism relational incentive contract self-enforcing constrain