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中国货币政策的福利损失及中介目标的选择——基于新凯恩斯DSGE模型的分析 被引量:46

The Welfare Losses of China's Monetary Policy and the Selection of Intermediate Target:A New Keynesian DSGE Model
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摘要 文章运用新凯恩斯框架下的DSGE模型对中国货币政策的福利损失进行分析,研究表明:(1)名义利率对通货膨胀的反应越是敏感,则福利损失越小,因此,货币当局应该充分利用利率政策稳定价格水平;(2)名义利率对产出的反应越是敏感,则福利损失越大,因此,货币当局不宜运用利率政策影响经济增长速度;(3)利率平滑对福利的影响不大,货币当局的利率政策应该直接针对通货膨胀,而不应该追求利率本身的稳定;(4)在一定条件下,不同的利率政策规则造成的福利损失差别不大,货币当局可以从便利的角度出发,根据上期的通货膨胀率和产出水平来设定当期的名义利率;(5)与利率变动相比,货币供应量的变动造成福利损失更大,因此,货币政策的中介目标应该逐步由货币供应量转向利率。 The paper studies the welfare losses of China's monetary policies under the framework of a new Keynesian DSGE model. The main findings are as follows, firstly, the more sensitive the nominal interest rate is to the inflation, the smaller the welfare losses are, so the monetary authorities should make full use of interest rate policies to stabilize the price level; secondly, the more sensitive the nominal interest rate is to the output, the bigger the welfare losses are, so the monetary authorities should not use the interest rate policies to affect the economic growth speed; thirdly, the stable interest rate has little effects on the welfare, so the interest rate policies should directly aim at the inflation, not the stabilization of the interest rate; fourthly, the welfare losses caused by different interest rate policies do not differ widely, so the monetary authorities can set up the current nominal interest rate according to the inflation rate and output level of the previous period; fifthly, the welfare losses caused by the changes of money supply are bigger than the ones caused by interest rate fluctuations, so the intermediate target of monetary policies should be changed from money supply to interest rate.
出处 《财经研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期89-98,共10页 Journal of Finance and Economics
基金 上海财经大学"211"第三期建设项目资助
关键词 货币政策 福利损失 利率规则 中介目标 monetary policy welfare loss interest rate rule intermediate target
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