摘要
对马克思的"实践"概念,要理解其变革性与具体规定性。把"实践"概念泛化,不符合辩证唯物论的本意。"实践"不能作为"本体",作为"存在"之源。马克思的实践观有一个发展变化的过程。将马克思实践观与海德格尔存在论结合,用实践论阐释"人生在世"是不妥当的。抽象的非历史的实践哲学和实践唯物主义,不是马克思主义哲学。用"存在论"取代"本体论",就容易将存在虚无化、客体实践化、主体生存化。建设马克思主义美学,应当使辩证法和唯物论得到彻底的贯彻。
For Marx's concept of practice, it is vital to understand its transformative and specific provi- sions. To generalize it does not meet the intention of dialectical materialism. Practice can not he taken as ontolo- gy, as the source of existence. Marx's view of practice has a process of development and changing. It is not ap- propriate to combine Marx's view of practice with Heidegger's ontology and to interpret the "living in the world" by practice. Marxist philosophy is not an abstract, non-historical practice philosophy and practical materialism. If ontology is replaced by existence, it is easy to empty existence, to practise object, and to survive subject. It is necessary for establishing Marx's aesthetics to implement completely dialectics and materialism.
出处
《上海大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期53-65,共13页
Journal of Shanghai University(Social Sciences Edition)