摘要
流动人口参保率低问题的主要原因是社会保障利益分配不均,但流入地、流出地、流动人口三者的社会保障外部性收益存在一致性.Shapley值法作为一种多方合作博弈的最优求解方法,强调基于成员贡献程度进行分配.考虑三方风险承担不对称性,引入了风险补偿因子,对各方社会保障利益函数进行了修正.通过数值算例求解结果表明,Shapley值法分配使得合作的三方利益都有增加,而风险担当较少的流入地对流出地和流动人口的风险补偿更体现了分配的公平,并有利于促进流动人口参保的积极性.
The main reason leading to low penetration of social security among floating population is imbalance of benefit allocation. But there exists consistency of benefit on social security among in-migrant area, out-migrant area and floating population. The optimal solution based on Shapley value method of n-person cooperative games, is allocated by the partners' contribution. To avoid the imbalance of risk taking among the partners, it is introduced a risk compensation model to modify the traditional method. A numerical example shows the modified model can improve the whole benefit of partners, and the risk compensation for the out-migrant and the floating population which bear more risk ensures the fair allocation of benefit which improves the positivity of floating population to join social security system.
出处
《复旦学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
CSCD
北大核心
2010年第1期88-93,共6页
Journal of Fudan University:Natural Science
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70533030)
关键词
流动人口
社会保障
利益分配
合作博弈
floating population
social security
benefit allocation
cooperative game theory