互惠与国际法规则的形成——博弈论视角的考察

Reciprocity and the Formation of International Law Rules

互惠在国际法的形成,以及保障国际法的约束力上所具有的重要作用很多学者已有论及。但既往的研究主要在经验层面上加以描述,并未进入科学层面。近年来博弈论引入国际法的研究,为揭示国际法规则的实质开辟了新的视角。学者们对互惠的含义理解并不相同,帕瑞斯从博弈论视角对互惠的内涵以及它与国际法之间关系的见解深刻。他在对社会存在的五种博弈模式进行研究的基础上,把互惠分为结构性互惠、诱导互惠和随机互惠三种。这些互惠模式在缺乏中央权威的国际关系中,可以导致不同形式的合作,形成不同的国际法规则。可以说,互惠构成了国际关系中的元规则。不过,互惠也并非能解释国际法一切规范的形成,强互惠所产生的利他行为就难以在互惠的框架内加以解释,而这却解释了像维护人权和国际共同利益这类对某些国家来说并非有益的价值和制度的生成。

Reciprocity plays an important role in the formation of international law, as well assecurity of binding force of international law. Many scholars have been dealt with these. However, the past study mainly lied in the level of experience described, did not enter the scientific level. In recent years, the game theory has been introduced into the research of international law which opened a new window to reveal the substance of the rules of international law. Especially, in this respect, Parisi observed the formation of rules from the perspective of game theory and its insightful connotation to international law. Based on his five types of game pattern about social existence, he classified reciprocity as structural reciprocity, induced reciprocity and stochastic reciprocity. These patterns of reciprocity in the absence of central authority in international relations, may lead to various forms of cooperation, thereby, to the formation of different rules of international law. It can be said that reciprocity constitutes a meta-rnle of international relations. However, reciprocity can not explain all of the formation of international rules. Altruism arising from strong reciprocity will be difficult to be explained in the framework of reciprocity, which explains such values and institutions as international human rights and international common interests disadvantage to certain countries.