期刊文献+

利益博弈、制度公正与城市拆迁纠纷化解机制 被引量:4

Interests' Game,Justice of Institutions and Harmonies of Social Interests Conflicts in Urban Demolition
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摘要 公正是一种建立在多方利益动态博弈均衡基础上的社会意识形态,城市拆迁制度的形成与实施实际上就是对这种博弈均衡的确认与保障;同时,只有相关制度体系的制定与实施过程体现了城市拆迁中相关利益主体博弈的均衡,该制度才是公正和良好的,城市拆迁纠纷才能得以解决。这就要求,城市拆迁立法或定制要依据博弈规则与均衡,通过强化公开机制和完善利益表达与拆迁参与机制来确立和保障公正,也就是确认和保护各种合理的符合市场价值或公益价值的利益。此外,从目前来看,建立、培育或完善作为第三部门的社会中间组织、强化城市拆迁听证制度,对实现利益均衡、强化制度公正来说是必要的、紧迫的。 The justice is a social ideology based on tutions and put it into practice are actually to affirm and same time, only the related institution system and its pu dynamic interests' game equilibrium and to form secure this game equilibrium in urban demolitio into practice could embody the comparative the insti- n. At the equilibrium of interests' game in urban demolition, the institution about urban demolition is just and excellent, and then the disputes and conflicts in urban demolition can be resolved. So, about legislation and formulating rules and regulations based on game' s rules and equilibrium must affirm and ensure justice through strengthening public mechanism and perfecting the mechanism of expression of interests and wholly participating in the process of urban demolition,namely, affirm and protect some reasonable interests to conform to market value or the public interests. On the oth- er hand, it is necessary for realizing interest equilibrium and strengthening the justice of institutions in the current political and administrative system that the third sector or the medium social sector is set up and the public hearing system of urban demolition is strengthened.
出处 《重庆大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第1期39-46,共8页 Journal of Chongqing University(Social Science Edition)
基金 国家自然科学基金项目"城市拆迁中的多方博弈机制及政策设计研究"(70703039) 国家社会科学基金项目"和谐社会的微观经济理论研究"(07BJY017)
关键词 城市房屋拆迁 制度 公正 博弈论 社会矛盾纠纷 urban house demolition institution justice game theory social conflict
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参考文献21

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