基于声誉的盈余管理监督机制研究

Research on Earnings Management Surveillance Mechanism Based on Prestige

盈余管理是企业经理层作为理性的代理人,在进行企业信息披露和报告过程中,利用其私人信息的比较优势,采用会计机会主义行为牟利的管理行为。在有限理性的前提下,契约必然是不完备的,存在道德风险和逆向选择问题,必须利用契约执行、监督机制来保证契约执行的效率。值得注意的前提是,由于盈余管理本身是在法律和法规允许的选择空间内进行的,因此,对于盈余管理的监督机制必然是一种"私人性"的保障机制。文章以制度分析、契约理论为分析工具,从实证的角度考察了基于声誉的盈余管理监督机制的可行性及制度基础。

Earnings management is profit-making management behavior by accounting opportunistic behavior, used by the company executives as rational agents, who take advantage of the comparison superiority about personal information during the enterprise information disclosure and report process. On the premise of the bounded rationality, the contract is inevitably incomplete, and there are the problems of moral risk and reverse option. It is necessary to execute surveillance mechanism by contract, so as to guarantee the execution efficiency. It is noteworthy the premise that earnings management itself is carried on in optional space, which is permitted by laws and regulations. Therefore, the surveillance mechanism toward earnings management is inevitably one kind of personal safeguard mechanisms. Taking the system analysis and contract theory as analytical tools, from the perspective of positive alanalysis, this paper inspects the feasibility and system foundation of earnings management surveillance mechanism based on prestige.