在职消费、股权制衡及其经济后果——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Perks of Managers,Check-and-Balance of Stock Ownership and Its Economic Consequences:Empirical Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

实证检验了股权制衡对上市公司高级管理人员在职消费的影响作用。研究发现:第一大股东持股比例越大,对高级管理人员在职消费的抑制作用越为明显;上市公司股权越为制衡,高级管理人员的在职消费越高。同时发现股权制衡度高的上市公司,其在职消费的激励效率较低。

This paper empirically studies the impact of check-and-balance of stock ownership on perks of managers. It is found that the largest shareholder can constrict the amount of perks of managers. The more balance of stock ownership, the larger the perks. It is also found that the incentive efficiency of perks is lower in companies with greater check-and-balance of stock ownership.