区域土地循环利用的过程控制:博弈分析的视角

Regional Land Recycling Process Control:Game Theory Perspective

将声誉和地方政府保护作为重要影响因子引入地方土地监管部门与土地使用者之间的博弈分析模型。研究显示:由于地方监管部门存在受土地使用者收买可能及其本身存在监督成本限制,地方监管部门不能完全有效监督土地使用者循环用地情况,并存在一定的"政府失灵"问题。因此,将中央政府作为土地使用者循环用地过程控制的二次监管者,对"政府失灵"问题能产生有效纠正,这为改进目前监管模式提出了新的启示。

This article will protect the reputation and local governments as an important factor affecting the introduction of local regulatory authorities and land users of land between the game analysis model.Studies have shown that： Due to the existence of local regulatory authorities may be affected by the land users to buy its own supervision cost constraints exist,the local regulatory authorities can not be completely effective supervision of land use of the land user cycle,and there is a certain degree of ＂government failure＂ problem.Therefore,the central government as a land users in the secondary process control loop site supervisor on the ＂government failure＂ problem can be an effective remedy,which is to improve the current regulatory approach proposed by a new revelation.