策略性管理授权下混寡模型中的税收选择——基于公营厂商视角

Assess Tax in Mixed Oligopoly Model Under Strategic of Managerial Delegation——Based on Non-Profit Firm

在公营厂商经营效率低于私营厂商的假设条件下,公营厂商作为一般经济体,与私营厂商并无区别。文章则放松这一假设,并将公营厂商视为兼顾自身利润和消费者剩余的经济体。加入考量公营厂商对其经理人选择管理授权后,通过设计具有一般性反需求函数的三阶段非合作赛局,求解子博弈完美均衡从而得到最优税率并且最大化社会福利。研究发现,如果公营厂商对其经理人的策略性管理授权接近于政府的目标函数,而且公营厂商所有者没有全部占有消费者剩余,那么,相对于混和寡占模型中的私营厂商和传统古诺竞争而言,政府对公营厂商课税的最适税率较低反而有利于增加社会福利。

On the assumption that working efficiency of non - profit firm （NPF） is lower than profit - maximizing firm （ PMF）, there will be no significant difference between them if NPF is considered as a general economic term by reviewing literature. This paper relaxes the assumption and considers NPF as an economic term concerning about consumer surplus not significant commercial aspect, in mixed oligop- oly model which has an n PMF and one NPF. Considering strategic managerial delegation of NPF, we design a formal analysis which is three - stage non corporate game having general inverse demand function to find optimal tax on NPF and maximize the social welfare. Our research find that if strategic managerial delegation is close to government objective function meanwhile the owner of NPF doesn＇t occupy all consumption surplus, then lower tax rate to NPF will increase the social welfare comparing MPFs and Cournot model.