期刊文献+

不完全竞争市场的纵向合并及其效应

On the Longitudinal Merge and its Effect based on the Imperfect Competitive Market
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摘要 企业间的纵向合并减少了产业中厂商的数量,提高了市场产品垄断能力,在一定程度上消除了双重加价对市场价格的扭曲,提高了企业生产效率,使社会总福利得到改善。通过以产量为决策变量对不完全竞争市场的纵向合并进行分析,结果表明:纵向合并并不是总能使厂商获利,它取决于上下游厂商数量及行业的市场结构,而消费者福利总能得到改善。 The longitudinal merge among enterprises can induce the manufactures quantity in the industry, improve the monopoly ability of market products, eliminate the distortion of the market price by the dual price increasing to a certain extent, increase the production efficiency of enterprises, and perfect the social total welfare. By analyzing the longitudinal merge of the imperfect competitive market taking the output as the decision variable, the result indicated that the longitudinal merge does not always cause the manufacturer profit,which is decided by the up- stream and downstream manufacturer quantity and the industrial market structure, but the con sumer welfare can always be improved.
作者 关华
出处 《财经理论与实践》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第2期84-87,共4页 The Theory and Practice of Finance and Economics
关键词 纵向合并 垄断 寡占市场 效应 Longitudinal merge Monopoly Oligopoly market Effect
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参考文献9

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