双重委托代理、信息不完全与评级失真

Double Principal-agent,Incomplete Information and Distorted Ratings

次贷危机暴露了现行以评级机构为主体的信用评级机制的诸多内在缺陷。采用双重委托代理模型从理论上刻画了评级过程中投资者、发行者与评级机构的互动关系,得出评级结果必须建立在发行者与评级机构共同努力的基础上、发行者自身提供真实可信的信息是评级真实可信的基础、发行者评级目的不同直接影响评级结果等结论。

The sub -prime crisis has exposed many inherent flaws of the current credit rating mechanism which is primarily dominated by credit rating agencies. The double principal- agent model has theoretically outlined the in- teractive relationships among the investors, issuers and the rating agencies during the rating process. Conclusions are drawn that the rating results must be based on co -working between the issuers and the rating agencies, that au- thentic and reliable information provided by issuers is the basis for a true and credible rating, and that the different rating purposes from the issuers have a direct impact on the rating results, etc.