我国上市公司高管人员薪酬与激励的实证研究

Empirical Study on Salary and Incentive of Senior Executives in China's Listed Companies

我国上市公司高管人员薪酬制度不合理,导致高管人员缺乏工作积极性和创造性,经营短期化行为普遍,极大地损害了广大股东的权益和投资者的积极性。通过抽样对上市公司高级管理人员薪酬与公司业绩、企业规模、行业、地区、国有股持股比例和高管持股比例等因素的回归实证研究,实行年薪制的企业的业绩并没有高于未实行年薪制的企业,未能有效激励高管人员做最大努力。实证研究再次证明,上市公司高管人员薪酬制度的研究,为理顺上市公司的利益分配关系,调动高管人员的积极性,保护广大股东的投资热情,实现上市公司乃至证券市场的可持续发展具有重要的现实意义。

The salary system of senior executives is irrational in China＇s listed companies, which causes them lack of initiative and ereativeness in work, causes short-term behavior popular, and greatly damages all shareholders＇ rights and interests and the investors＇ enthusiasm. This paper takes regressive and empirical study on the factors of salary and performance, enterprise scale, industry, region, proportion of state-holding share, and that of share-holding by senior executives through samples of listed companies in China. The study shows that the performance of the enterprise practicing annual salary system is not higher than that of other enterprises, which means that annual salary system cannot motivate senior executives to give of their best effectively. The study proves that it is practical and significant for listed companies to rationalize the relationship of benefit distribution, to arouse the enthusiasm of senior executives, to protect all shareholders＇ investing enthusiasm, and to realize sustainable development of listed companies and even the stock market.