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期权激励之机会成本计量分析

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摘要 期权激励的核心目标是解决公司股东和经理人之间目标函数不一致所产生的委托-代理矛盾。本文以金融工程的期权定价理论为基础,借助二叉树模型的分析框架,比较了在股东授予经理人股票期权与出售给外部投资者时的两种不同情况,根据股东财富的变化,构建出度量机会成本的计量模型,为股票期权的研究提供了新的思路。
出处 《消费导刊》 2010年第4期52-52,共1页
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