组合拍卖与议价谈判机制设计研究

Mechanism design on combinatorial auctions and bargaining

设计了一种先"组合拍卖"再"议价谈判"的多物品出售两阶段机制.论文分析表明,机制的组合拍卖阶段保持了VCG机制的激励相容性质,在机制的议价谈判阶段,存在4种不同类别的获胜投标者,就拍卖者将采取的不同价格策略,可将其区分为"第1类投标者"和"第2类投标者".据此,找到了拍卖者采取不同价格策略的相应条件.给出了该机制中拍卖者与任意获胜投标者之间的博弈均衡路径.就买卖双方的总估价而言,存在不同相对关系下的不同交易结果.对比该机制和经典VCG机制,该机制改进社会交易福利值为:第1类投标者在议价价格和VCG价格下带给拍卖者利润的变化值.此结果表明,该机制的社会交易福利优于经典VCG机制.

We design a two-stage mechanism for tions, which first implements VCG combinatorial tween one-unit auction and combinatorial auction more efficient and practical heterogeneous goods sale opera- auction then price bargaining. Specifically, a difference be- is existence of different types in winner bidders： 4 types in our mechanism. We show that, the auction stage keeps incentive compatible property in VCG. The five types of winner bidders can be divided into two groups, i. e. , ＂1st class bidders＂ and ＂2nd class bidders＂. For buyer, there exist decision conditions for 2 possible strategies in bargaining this game between the buyer and any seller. Compared with classical VCG proves social trade welfare with a value, and the economics meaning of the difference between VCG prices and bargaining stage. Equilibrium path exists in mechanism, our mechanism imvalue is auctioneer＇s net profits prices generated by ＂1 st class bidders＂.