关联竞赛模型参与选择及均衡策略

Equilibrium analysis for affiliated effort contests model

在独立努力竞赛模型中,参与人赢得竞赛的概率与自身的投入正相关.本论文提出一种关联努力竞赛模型刻画参与人之间努力程度的关联性.研究了关联程度强弱对参与决策的影响.分析了当竞赛组织者设立最低参与努力程度时参与人的参与选择以及努力决策,得到参与人赢得的概率与自身投入之间的正相关性不再成立、参与人之间不存在纯参与均衡策略的结论.

The winning probability of player in the contest depends not only on the player＇s effort,but on the opposition＇s participate strategy.In this paper,we construct an affiliated effort Contests model to depict the paly＇s winning probability and test the first-order necessary conditions to the existence of Nash equilibrium.Under the power distribution value,we analyzed the Nash equilibrium of symmetric and asymmetric value model.