地方环境监管困境解释——政治激励与财政约束假说

Explaining Local Environmental Regulation Dilemma:Hypothesis of Political Incentives and Financial Restraints

本文将地方政府视作理性人,对其在政治晋升和财政制度环境下的环境监管困境进行了分析。假设地方政府兼具政治人、经济人和道德人的多重理性特征,既追求政治权力也追求经济利益,同时还关注个人声望,行为上表现为追求政治晋升和充裕地方财政。中国现行的政治激励体系暗含着"GDP至上"的潜规则,地方政府为提升政绩必然专注于经济发展。分税制改革以来的财政体制下,事权和财权不相匹配的矛盾在基层政府表现突出,财政压力也促使其选择优先发展经济以充裕地方财政。现存的激励和约束制度环境短期内难以更改,因此,地方政府面临着环境监管的困境。

Assuming local governments as rational actors, this article puts forward a hypothesis that political incentives and financial re- straints are institutional causes for local environmental regulation dilemma. From the perspective of political incentives, Chi- nat current system of political promotion incentives implies the facto rule of GDP supremacy. This incentives push the local top leaders devote their minds to economic achievements, especially short - term achievements during their tenure. From the perspective of financial restraints, mismatch between financial power and routine power since the tax distribution reform makes local finance very difficult. In order to finish tasks assigned for more promotion chances, local governments will also try to make the local finance rich by economic development. So it is not difficult to understand why local governments prefer economic development to environmental regulation. Capacity deficiency on environmental protection investment further wors- ened the situation.