摘要
基于委托-授权下的Cournot寡头竞争市场模型,分析了工会的合并是否会刺激企业的合并。通过4阶段博弈的子博弈完美纳什均衡解,发现2个相互独立的工会将会为了得到更大的利益而合并,但这种合并不利于企业所得的增加。
The paper analyses a duopolistic market Cournot model to examine how unions affect the incentives for the merger of firms.By the solution of subgame perfect equilibrium of four-stage game,we find out that two independent unions would unite as a single union in order to get a greater surplus,but the merger will do harm to the increase of the firms＇ gains.
出处
《管理学报》
CSSCI
2010年第3期350-353,共4页
Chinese Journal of Management
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(08XJY002)
