供应链中服务品质保证的制造商监控策略

Research into Manufacturer's Strategies of Monitoring Service Quality in Supply Chain

研究了制造商对代理商和零售商进行监控从而保证供应链中服务品质的行为机理。建立博弈模型对制造商、代理商和零售商的多方博弈关系进行了分析,通过不同条件下收益情况的比较得出制造商的最优监控策略,从而保证供应链中的服务品质。研究结果表明,制造商的监控行为在很大程度上取决于监控成本,而产品的市场规模以及供应链整体服务品质的要求也会对监控产生影响。

The paper discusses the behavioural mechanism of manufacturers in monitoring the behaviour of agents and retailers to guarantee the service quality in supply chain.A model of game is set up to analyze the multiple relationship among manufacturers,agents and retailers by comparing their profits under different situations to figure out the optimum monitoring strategies of the manufactures. It is shown that the monitoring by the manufacturers is greatly influenced by monitoring-cost,market scope and the service quality of the whole supply chain.