许可租金分配条件下事前被许可企业自主创新投资决策研究

Ex Ante Licensee’s Independent Innovation Investment Decisions under Rents Division of License

为更深入了解事前被许可企业如何对待自主创新,依据同质产品Cournot双寡头垄断市场和渐进性创新的假设前提,通过建立技术许可和R&D竞争模型来研究事前被许可企业自主创新投资决策。研究结果表明,事前被许可企业支付的单位产品提成越高,及其在技术交易中分配的租金越少,则其对自主创新的均衡投资越多,但预期利润越小。因此,事前被许可企业在实际的技术交易过程中能够获得较大租金份额的事实,意味着其对自主创新投资偏少,但预期利润较大。

In order to understand in depth how ex ante licensee deals with independent innovation, with the underlying assumption that there is a homogeneous-good Cournot duopoly and incremental innovation is considered, ex ante licensee＇s independent innovation investment decisions are studied through building a model of licensing and R＆D race. Results show that the higher royalty rate is, namely the smaller ex ante licensee＇s share of the gains from licensing is, then the more ex ante licensee＇s equilibrium investments on independent innovation are, but the fewer its expected profits are. The fact that ex ante licensee is able to gain a larger share of rents from licensing means that it invests fewer on independent innovation while having more expected profits.