摘要
运用博弈论中不完全信息静态博弈的贝叶斯纳什均衡分析了工程建设无标底招标时的最优投标报价策略,建立了投标人盈利函数的数学模型并求解,指出低价投标的重要意义。
It analyzes optimal bid invitation policy of no-base-price tender for engineering construction by using Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the static game of in-perfect information in Game theory, establishes mathematic model of profitable function for tenders and solves it, and points out the important significance of low price tender.
出处
《山西建筑》
2010年第11期249-250,共2页
Shanxi Architecture
关键词
博弈论
不完全信息静态博弈
贝叶斯纳什均衡
无标底招标
投标报价
Game theory, the static game of in-perfect information, Bayesian Nash equilibrium, no-base-price tender, bid price
