摘要
Preference is a core notion in philosophy,game theory,decision theory and utility theory,and it has played a central role in philosophy of action and rational choice. This paper studies preferences from a logical perspective. I first introduce an existing Doxastic preference logic over individual objects,and then extend it to propositions. A new Doxastic preference logic over propositions is proposed,and its completeness and a representation theorem have been proved. The paper also explores a notion of propositional preference as a lift from preference relations over possible worlds and presents a complete logic for it. Finally,the two Doxastic preference logics over objects and over propositions,respectively,are compared,and I show that they are essentially the same in terms of reasoning with preferences.
Preference is a core notion in philosophy,game theory,decision theory and utility theory,and it has played a central role in philosophy of action and rational choice. This paper studies preferences from a logical perspective. I first introduce an existing Doxastic preference logic over individual objects,and then extend it to propositions. A new Doxastic preference logic over propositions is proposed,and its completeness and a representation theorem have been proved. The paper also explores a notion of propositional preference as a lift from preference relations over possible worlds and presents a complete logic for it. Finally,the two Doxastic preference logics over objects and over propositions,respectively,are compared,and I show that they are essentially the same in terms of reasoning with preferences.
出处
《哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第3期103-109,共7页
Philosophical Research
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究基金项目(编号09YJC72040001)资助