定向增发新股、资产注入类型与上市公司绩效的关系--来自中国证券市场的经验证据

The Private Placements of Equity (PPE),Types of Asset-Injecting and Performance of the Listed Companies——the evidence from the China's Security Market

股权分置改革之后,通过定向增发新股实现控股股东向上市公司注入资产成为中国证券市场的"热点"问题。本文对2006-2007年间不同类型定向增发资产注入的短期宣告效应和长期持有超额收益率进行比较研究发现,其短期累积超额收益率无显著差异,但投资者获得的长期持有超额收益率与资产注入类型显著相关。当注入的资产与上市公司的业务相关时,投资者获得的长期持有超额收益率显著高于注入的资产与上市公司的业务不相关的长期持有超额收益率,因此,可能存在控股股东向上市公司注入劣质资产进行利益输送的现象。本文用大股东与小股东的代理理论解释了上述现象。

After the reform of split share structure,it is a hot topic that the controlling shareholders inject assets into listed companies by the Private Placements of Equity(PPE)in the China's capital market.The paper analyzes the short-term announcement effect and long-term buy-hold abnormal return(BHAR)of different types of Assets-Injecting by PPE in the period of 2006-2007 and finds that,there is no significant difference between short-term cumulative abnormal returns,but there is significant difference between BHARs.When the type is related,the BHAR is higher and the difference is significant statistically.Hence,the controlling shareholders may inject poor-quality assets into listed companies by PPE to tunnel the listed companies.The paper explains the above phenomenon using the agency theory between the majority shareholders and minority shareholders.