摘要
文章集中分析了在招商竞争中地方政府与企业之间、地方政府之间的动态博弈过程。通过建立一个三阶段的完美信息动态博弈模型,指出地方政府之间的招商竞争下,企业拥有了"退出"选择的可能。企业退出成本越低,"退出"选择的可置信威胁越大,其向政府"呼吁"产生的效果越好。对于地方政府来说,与其进行"让利竞争",不如完善地方公共设施与提高公共服务的质量,提供良好的制度与经济环境,锁定辖区内的企业,为地方经济的发展提供强劲的推动力。
The paper focuses on discussing the dynamic game process between the local govern-ment and enterprises and among local governments in attraction investment competition.Through the establishment of a three stages of perfect information dynamic game model,we pointed out the "profits"competition between local governments giving enterprises chance to"exit"option.the lower the cost of "exit",the more effect of incredibly threatened to government,and the better effect caused by "voice".For local government,it is better to improve the local public facilities of public service quality than profits "competition",provide good system and economic environment,locking the enterprises,offering strong impetus to the development of local economy.
出处
《广西经济管理干部学院学报》
2010年第1期61-66,共6页
Journal of GuangXi Cadres College of Economic and Management
关键词
招商竞争
地方政府
企业
博弈
attracting investment competition
local government
enterprise
game