财务危机管理中的动态博弈分析

Dynamic Game Analysis in Financial Crisis Management

在财务危机管理的过程中,管理者必须根据阶段性的处理结果和发展趋势动态地调整管理活动。本文在动态博弈模型的框架下分析了财务危机管理中"危机"与"管理者"之间的动态博弈过程:财务危机在发出危机信号时,管理者通过观察财务危机发作所选择的行动来推断其类型或修正对其类型的先验概率分布,然后选择最优行动,财务危机预计到其行动被管理者所利用,就会传递不利的信息,整个过程是财务危机和管理者不断行动,不断修正过程;并探讨了利用博弈模型生成管理者所期望成本最小、保障率最高的预案。

During the procedure of financial crisis management,a manager must adjust dynamically management activities according to the time-phased processing result and the developing trend.Under the framework of dynamic game model,this paper analyzes the game process between ＂crisis＂ and ＂manager＂ in the management of financial crisis：when financial crisis sends out crisis signal,the manager will diagnose its type or correct the distribution of prior probability of this type by observing the action presented by financial crisis.And then,he will take the most proper action.If financial crisis has predicted that its activity would be utilized by the manager,it would send out unfavorable message.During the whole procedure,the financial crisis and the manager have been keeping taking actions and correcting them.And the paper also discusses how to make an expected pre-arranged planning with least cost and highest coverage ratio by using game model.