企业经营者报酬契约市场化的代理成本

Research on Agency Costs of the Market—oriented Indexes on Reward Contract for Firms' Managers

构建市场起基础作用的企业经营者激励和制约机制,有效降低代理成本,规避代理风是完善企业经营者报酬契约的市场化的必然选择。应用代理理论模型,设计企业经营者的市场化报酬契约,并为此基础分析降低代理成本的因素影响和路径选择,实现帕累托最优结果从而为完善企业经营者激励和制约机制提供有益的借鉴。

It is necessary to strengthen the firm＇s reform that building the incentive and restraint mechanism for firms＇ managers and reducing agency costs effectively,avoiding agency risks.This paper applies principal-agent theory models to design as foundation to analyse the factors that reducing the impact of agency costs and of path selection in order to realize Pareto optimum result.It puts forward valuable suggestions on perfecting the incentive and restraint mechanism for firms＇ managers.