经济相互依赖、退出成本与国家间冲突升级——基于动态博弈模型的理论分析

Economic Interdependence,Exit Cost and Conflict Escalation:A Theoretical Analysis Based on Dynamic Game Model

经济相互依赖如何影响国家间的政治关系是一个颇受争议的话题。基于马克.克里森兹的退出模型,作者构建了一个五阶段动态博弈模型,从动态视角考察经济相互依赖如何影响不同级别的冲突,并着重对经济相互依赖如何抑制冲突升级的内在机制进行了理论研究,得出如下结论:随着经济相互依赖的加深,国家间发生低级别冲突的概率将会增加,但是低级别冲突升级为战争的概率下降,即经济相互依赖有助于抑制冲突的升级。最后利用1949～2008年中美间政治经济关系的现实对理论分析的结论做了进一步的说明。

How economic interdependence influences international politics has long been a debate.Based on Crescenzi’s exit model,this article constructs a five-stage game model and tries to explore how economic interdependence influences international conflicts of different levels from a dynamic perspective,trying to find out how economic interdependence dampens conflict escalation.The basic conclusions are:higher economic interdependence increases the likelihood of low-level conflicts while decreasing the likelihood of high-level conflicts.It implies that economic interdependence has played a certain role during the process of conflict escalation.The Sino-U.S.relationship between 1949 and 2008 supports the theoretical conclusions empirically.