基于声誉约束的民间金融组织风险及其防范

Risk of Informal Financial Organizations:Based On Reputation

从民间金融组织发起者和参与者间博弈角度进行的分析表明:参与者会基于发起者的资金回报承诺、发起者本人的信誉和相应的法律约束对民间金融组织进行投资;随着组织规模扩大,发起人违约成本减少、违约收益增加使得发起者放弃声誉而导致民间金融组织风险爆发;在极端情形下,民间金融组织继续运营的最低限度依赖于市场在未来对违约者的惩罚,而这一惩罚不能低于发起者违约而获得的本应属于参与者参与组织的本息之和。

Using game theory,this paper explains the relationship between the initiator and participant.Based on initiator＇s repayment pledge,reputation and legal restraint,the participant invests in informal financial organization.With the organization scale expanding,the initiator penalty cost reduces and income increases,which cause the initiator to give up reputation,so the informal financial organization risk erupts.Under the extreme condition,the informal financial organization relies on the future penalty for the initiator by market,and this penalty must be greater than the interest income that belongs to the participant.