大股东代理与上市公司信息欺诈

Blockholder's Agency Problems and China's Listed Companies' Information Fraud

与已有研究忽视不同类型信息披露违规的动机差异而将它们混为一体的做法不同,选择一个相对"干净"的信息欺诈样本,研究了上市公司信息欺诈的影响因素。统计发现,69%的公司信息欺诈内容涉及关联交易事项,且绝大多数是与大股东的关联交易。Logistic回归结果表明:大股东持股比例越低,公司信息欺诈可能性越大;民营控股公司比其他公司更容易发生信息欺诈;而董事会特征、地区市场化进程等治理指标则与信息欺诈无关。因此,信息欺诈案例表明,大股东的控股比例越低,大股东的代理问题越不容忽视;在外部治理环境不改善的情况下,控股股东民营化未必能降低上市公司的代理成本。

Different from current literature＇s ignoring differences of motivations behind kinds of informational violations by China＇s listed companies, this paper selects a ＂clean＂ sample with homogeneous motivation of violation to test which factors cause corporate information fraud. Evidences show that 69 percent companies＇ frauds involve in related party transactions, most of which are transaction with the blockholder. Logistic regression results show that the fewer the blockholder hold its share, the higher probability the com- pany involve information fraud, and private controlled companies are more likely to involve fraud than other companies. However, other corporate governance measures, such as independence of board of directors and local marketization level are unrelated to corporate information fraud. Once the blockholder gets control rights, less shares held by the blockholder, more serious the blockholder＇s agency problems are, and privatization of the blockholder of listed companies does not necessarily means decrease of their agency costs if external governance environments dont improve greatly.