论中国经济转型期权力租金来源与控制——一个理论模型及基于1978～2007年数据的实证分析

On the Source and the Control of Power Rent in China during the Economic Transition Period——A Theoretical Model and an Empirical Analysis Based on the Data from 1978 to 2007

以中国经济转型过程中的政府行为变迁为研究背景,在分析公共权力来源与权力租金形成条件的基础上,构建公共权力分配与权力租金规模理论模型,从理论和实证角度分析权力租金来源及其控制机制设计问题。认为:转型社会政府官员权力租金来源于权力稀缺性与排他性使用,公共权力的免费使用与高成本运行会导致腐败和非生产性寻利活动(DUP)的产生;权力租金来源于使用权力的"生产者剩余",与公共权力使用成本的过快增长紧密相关;提高社会非权力产品生产的平均报酬率、增加替代性公务员比例能够弱化政府雇员追求权力租金的激励机制。

The paper takes the change of government behaviors during China＇ s economic transition period as the research background, and based on analyzing the source of public power and the formation of power rent, a model is constructed on the public power distribution and power rent scale, and the source and the control of power rent in China is analyzed from theoretical and empirical angles. The author believes that the source of power rent in the period for social government officials comes from power scarcity and the use of exclusiveness. The free use of public power and high cost operation lead to corruption and nonproductive profit - seeking activities （DUP） ; power rent comes from ＂producer surplus＂ of power use, which is closely related with the over increase of the public power using costs. Finally, the paper gives some suggestions to protect officers from corruption in using power.