委托人代理人竞争力与合约报酬分配均衡

Impacts of the Principle's Competitiveness and the Agent's Competitiveness on the Distribution Equilibrium of Contract Reward

委托人代理人竞争力是委托代理合约设计与报酬分配的重要决定因素。构建的委托人代理人竞争力合约模型表明:①委托人代理人竞争力独自决定各自的固定收入报酬,并与竞争力投入策略、二阶成本因素和代理人风险偏好因素共同决定剩余收入分配;②委托人代理人竞争力及其投入策略反应对合约设计、合约产出、剩余收入分配、竞争力投入比例的影响受合约报酬偏好、二阶成本和风险偏好因素的约束;③委托人代理人竞争力及其投入策略的非对称性是剩余收入分配冲突产生的根源,也是合约动态调整、报酬分配变动与合约有效性变化的重要原因;④调控合约报酬分配应该着力调节委托人代理人竞争力关系和策略反应。

The principle-agent＇ competitiveness are important factors that influence the contract design and reward.We build up a principle-agent model which shows that： i）the principle＇s competitiveness determines contract fixed income,and the surplus income together with competitiveness input strategy reaction,their preference between the competitiveness and reward,the marginal cost factor,and the agent＇s risk adverse factor;ii）the principle-agent＇ competitiveness have asymmetrical effects on contract design,contract production,surplus income distribution,the input ratio of the principle＇s competitiveness and the input ratio of the agent＇s competitiveness,which depends on the principle-agent reward preference,the marginal cost factor,and the agent＇s risk adverse factor;iii） the asymmetry of principle-agent＇s competitiveness and the dynamic change of strategy reaction are basic causes of the conflicts of surplus distribution between the principle and the agent,and also the main causes that drive the dynamic adjustment,reward distributing and change of the contract efficiency;iv） the adjustment of contract reward should focus on changing the principle-agent＇s competitiveness structure and strategy reaction.