市场环境下梯级水电资源有效配置的代理机制

An Agency Mechanism on Ensuring Efficient Deployment of Cascaded Hydropower Resources in an Electricity Market Environment

提出了一种保证市场环境下梯级水电资源有效配置的代理机制,以解决不同主体梯级水电站单独参与市场时造成的梯级水电资源配置低效性问题。针对该代理机制,在Barraquand-Martinea美式期权定价模型中引入多维随机路径模拟和基于收益年值指标的路径区块划分方法,以实现考虑多种不确定因素的水电站长期盈利水平灵活评估;运用讨价还价模型分析梯级水电站代理双方的非合作动态博弈均衡。算例结果验证了梯级水电站代理机制可以实现对原有梯级水电资源配置的帕累托改进,并表明所建立的实物期权模型能够有效考虑多种不确定因素对实物期权价值的共同作用。

An agency mechanism to ensure the efficient deployment of hydropower resources by electricity market competition is proposed. It can be used to solve the low efficiency problem when cascaded hydropower stations individually behave on behalf of their respective interests. Real option pricing model and bargaining model are used to analyse the agency mechanism. By introducing multi-dimension stochastic path simulation and block separation based on annual profit index, Barraquand-Martinea model of American option pricing is improved to evaluate feasible long-term profit of a hydropower station. A bargaining model is applied to analyse the noncooperative dynamic game equilibrium of agency. The numeric result verifies that the agency mechanism of cascaded hydropower stations can achieve the Pareto improvement of hydropower resources＇ deployment, and shows that the effects of uncertainty factors on value of real option can be considered in the Barraquand-Martinea model.