中国征地冲突博弈模型的构建与分析

Analyzing Land Expropriation Conflicts in China Based on a Newly-built Game Model

研究目的:构建符合中国国情的征地冲突博弈模型,分析失地农民和地方政府在冲突中的战略选择过程。研究方法:博弈论,比较静态分析。研究结果:新模型考虑了中国农村纠纷解决机制对征地冲突的影响,也能够运用比较静态分析,推导政策因素变动对征地冲突的影响。研究结论:中国征地冲突管理的关键在于改革当前农村纠纷解决机制。改革建议包括:(1)建立农村纠纷监控和甄别机制;(2)健全多元纠纷解决机制;(3)改革信访制度。

The purpose of this paper is to build Game Model of land expropriation conflicts （LECs） that accord with China＇ s actual situation, which is used to demonstrate the strategy choices of land-lost peasants and local government that are involved in the conflicts. Methods used include game theory and statics comparison analysis. The results show that the newly-buih game model has included the impacts of rural dispute settlement mechanism on LECs. It further uses the method of statics comparison analysis to deduce the impacts of changed policies on LECs. The conclusion of the study is that the reforming rural disputes settlement mechanism is critical to govern LECs. The policy recommendations are： （1）setting up a monitoring and distinguishing mechanism of rural disputes; （2）ameliorating a dispute settlement system for multiple-dimension disputes; （3）reforming the current petition system.