商业银行引入战略投资者定价行为分析

The Analysis on the Share Pricing Behavior of the Commercial Bank in the Introduction of the Strategically Investors

本文主要分析了商业银行引入战略投资者时,战略投资者与商业银行对所参股的定价问题。通过分析,得出在不同边际成本条件下,商业银行股份的定价在边际成本不变条件下战略投资者所支付的价格高于城市商业银行股份的实际价值,该价格会落在一定的价格区间内,而在边际成本可变的条件下战略投资者和城市商业银行将会达成一个最优定价,当存在投资限制时战略投资者往往会选择投资至最高上限。

This paper examine the share pricing theory of the commercial bank in the introduction of the strategically investors. From the perspective of the game theory, the price offered by the strategically investor is higher than the real value of the commercial bank when the marginal cost is invariable, and the price will fall in a certain price range, but both sides will reach an optimal price when the marginal cost is variable. And the investor will reach the upper limit when there is an investment restriction.