摘要
在双矩阵博弈中完美平衡点是非劣的.Eric van Damme提出这些非劣的点满足一个引理,但这个引理在证明过程中的充分性不成立,在实例中也表明了引理的结论不正确.
A perfect equilibrium is undominated in a bimatrix game, Eric van Damme posed that these undominated equilibriums satisfy a lemma in Stability and Perfection of Nash Equilibria. But the sufficiency of this lemma is wrong in the proving process and some examples also prove it.
出处
《重庆工商大学学报(自然科学版)》
2010年第2期111-113,共3页
Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University:Natural Science Edition
关键词
双矩阵博弈
完美平衡点
劣策略
非劣策略
bimatrix game
perfect equilibrium
undominated strategy
dominated strategy