有限信息与有限实施下的相互保险机制安排

On Mutual Insurance Mechanism Arrangement with Limited Information and Limited Enforcement

相互保险是农村家庭应付不确定性收入波动的非正式制度安排。理论上,标准的相互保险模型表明:在一个农村社区中,对单个家庭所面临的特殊性风险,相互保险机制能够实现风险配置的帕累托最优。然而它忽略了两大限制性因素:有限信息与有限实施。前者表现为逆向选择和道德风险,此时,相互保险机制的实施不是帕累托最优的;后者则源于强制性约束制度的缺乏和高收入家庭的违约激励,此时,相互保险是约束有效的。

Mutual insurance is an informal mechanism arrangement for the rural families to cope with the fluctuations in uncertain income.Theoretically,the standard mutual insurance model shows：in a rural community,it can realize the optimized Pareto risk arrangement for a specific family facing idiosyncratic risks.However,it ignores the two restrictive factors：limited information and limited enforcement.The former is manifested by the adverse selection and moral hazard,incapable of realizing the optimized Pareto for mutual insurance mechanism implementation;the latter is sterm from lacking compulsory obligation and high-income families＇ default incentive,for which the mechanism constrains effectiveness.