法经济学视野下的反垄断法之宽恕制度

On the Leniency Policy of Anti-monopoly Law from the Views of Law and Economics

反垄断法宽恕制度是查处垄断协议即卡特尔协议的有效政策工具,该制度的内容设计是否合理对查处卡特尔的效果具有关键作用。本文运用古诺模型和供给需求理论分析了宽恕制度产生的原因,运用博弈均衡理论分析了宽恕制度内容的合理性,指出我国《反垄断法》宽恕制度在获得宽恕的条件和民事损害赔偿等方面仍亟需完善。

The leniency policy of Anti-monopoly Law is an effective policy tool to investigate and prosecute the monopoly agreements,or Cartel agreements in another way.Whether its content design is reasonable plays a key role in the effect of investigating and prosecuting the Cartel agreements.By using the Cournot model and the supply-demand theory to analyze the reason for the birth of leniency policy,employing the game equilibrium theory to explain its rationality,this article shows that the leniency policy of Anti-monopoly Law is to be perfected in the scope of punishment and the conditions for having the leniency.