摘要
针对车险中投保人既存在影响出险损失概率又存在影响出险损失规模的道德风险进行了研究,通过建立信号传递博弈模型,对投保人和保险人的博弈策略进行了分析并得出了解决投保人道德风险的应对之策。
The paper discussed the moral hazard in car insurance which not only affecting losing probability but also affecting losing scale model. By using the signaling games theory, this paper researched game strategy between the insured and the insurer, giving the solution of insured moral hazard on the insurer.
出处
《西南科技大学学报》
CAS
2010年第1期85-88,93,共5页
Journal of Southwest University of Science and Technology
基金
四川省教育厅人文社会科学石油天然气发展项目(川油汽SKB07)
关键词
道德风险
出险损失概率
信号传递博弈
Moral hazard
Affecting losing probability
Signaling games theory