药品专利保护悖论研究综述:从公地悲剧到反公地悲剧

The Literature Review on Game Analysis about Patent Protection for Pharmaceuticals——From "Tragedy of the Commons" to "Tragedy of the Anti-commons"

从有关药品专利保护的"公地悲剧"和"反公地悲剧"的文献中,可以梳理出药品专利制度变迁的内在逻辑和基本矛盾。专利制度通过赋予专利权人对其专利药品的垄断权,使得产权主体地位得以明晰,维护了药物研发创新的积极性,从而避免了"公地悲剧"。但目前医药产业"专利丛林"现象,极易造成专利成果利用不足和上游基础研究被闲置的"反公地悲剧";通过实施强制许可和建立专利联盟可以在一定程度上克服这一问题,但更为积极的思路在于进一步研究和探讨最优的药品专利保护制度。

The aim of this paper is to obtain the inherent logic and fundamental conflicts of tragedy of the commons and tragedy of the anti-commons for pharmaceutical patent protection through literature review. The patent regime bestows monopoly right on inventor in order to highlight the status of inventor and maintains the enthusiasm for pharmaceutical R＆D and innovation. Therefore tragedy of commons is avoided. Patent thickets in the pharmaceutical industry are prone to the tragedy of anti-commons, that is, the inefficiency of patents and idle of upstream invention results. To some extent, compulsory license and patent alliance are popular measures to avoid the tragedy of anti-commons. However the in-depth exploration on the optimal patent protection for pharmaceuticals is most effective measure.