周期性边界条件下的三方演化少数者博弈

Evolutionary minority game with three options on periodic boundary condition

提出并研究了周期性边界条件下的三方演化少数者博弈模型.在该模型中,每个经纪人有一组概率(p1,p2,p3=1-p1-p2),做决定时或者以概率p1(p3)选择去最近相同历史下的少数方(多数方),或者以概率p2选择去最近相同历史下的中间方.数值模拟结果显示,在周期性边界条件下系统的整体效益要比在反射边界条件下的好.边界条件对三方演化少数者博弈有影响.

Evolutionary minority game with three options on periodic boundary condition is proposed. In this model, each agent carries his own set of probabilities （P1, P2, P3 = 1 -p1 -P2）. An agent has the probability p1 （P3） to choose the predicted least （most） popular option, and probability P2 to follow the prediction on the intermediate option. Numerical results show that the system performance on periodic boundary condition is better than that on reflective boundary condition. Boundary condition affects the performance of the system for evolutionary minority game with three options.