摘要
笔者通过阐述投资者法律保护对公司治理和关联交易的影响,搭建三者之间的关系,实证比较了大陆、香港、美国三个不同投资者法律保护环境下上市公司关联交易及公司治理结构的差异,验证了理论分析结论,即完善的投资者法律保护有利于形成保护中小股东利益的公司治理结构安排,进而能够更有效地抑制关联交易行为;投资者法律保护作为外部治理机制,对关联交易的影响强于公司内部治理机制。
By expounding the effect of investors' legal protection on corporate governance and affiliate transaction, the authors set up the relationship among them, make an empirical comparison of the differences in affiliate transaction and corporate governance structure under different environments of the legal protection of investors in China's Mainland, Hongkong and America, and test the conclusions of theoretical analysis, i. e. perfect legal protection of investors is beneficial to the formation of corporate governance which protects the benefits of small and medium stockholders and thus restrains effectively affiliate transaction; as an exterior governance mechanism, the impact of the legal protection of investors on affiliate transaction is stronger that that of interior corporate governance.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2010年第2期83-86,98,共5页
Economic Survey
基金
"985"工程二期项目(07200701)
国家自然科学基金项目(70572039)
关键词
投资者法律保护
公司治理
关联交易
investors' legal protection
corporate governance
affiliate transaction