摘要
The international financial reporting standard for cash flow statement （IAS 7） provides options for the classification of certain cash flow items （arbitrary items）. Therefore, business firms may classify the arbitrary items using the option that would maximize their own interest. This reduces the comparability of financial statements amongst business firms. This study aims to investigate the factors explaining management preferences in the selection of financial reporting practices on the arbitrary cash flow items. It concludes that managers tend to magnify the CFO reported in order to maximize the shareholders＇ wealth, which in turn would maximize their compensation. Managers of business firms with a relatively smaller size of CFO tend to classify interest paid and dividends paid as non-CFO in order to magnify their CFO. They also tend to classify interest received as CFO in order to inflate their relatively smaller size of CFO up to expectation. Similarly, managers of business firms with a relative larger size of dividends paid would classify the dividends paid outside CFO.
