基于管理效率的公私合作项目伙伴选择与激励机制

The Selection of Partner and Incentive Mechanism in PPP Based on Management Efficiency During Operation Stage

公私合作模式(PPP)进行公共项目建设有利于解决建设资金紧张以及政府在投资管理上的低效问题.目前用相关利益者理论把PPP模式作为社会博弈来研究,PPP模式相关的公共机构理论,PPP项目的政府监管与定价机制.针对公共项目在投资中期或运行期的公私合作伙伴选择和投资激励契约问题,在政府对项目已作了前期融资和了解的条件下,建立了公私合作伙伴关系的联合投资契约及补贴模型.区分对称和非对称信息两种情形,就如何设计最优契约才能使合作投资双方都能真实地表明他们的努力和管理水平信号进行了研究,分析了政府管理效率对合作投资契约的影响,为公共项目在投资中期或运行期实施公私合作伙伴关系投资提供了决策依据.

Public-private partnerships construction mode can solve the lack of infrastucture construction fund, solve the inefficient of government management in the public-invest projects. Nowadays, achievement in ppp model research mainly focus on those field： Public- Private Partnership （PPP） as a social game by use of stakeholder theory, set up those theory on public administration and utilities, mechanism of governmental regulation and pricing mechanism. In view of the selection of partner and incentive problems of public-private syn- dicated investments in second and operation stage, an contract model and subsidy is set up between government and private company in case the government has already a signal about the project＇s operation quality from his initial funding of the project. Under symmetric and asymmetric information ,the model analyzes how the optimal syndication contracts can in- duce public-private partnership to truthfully reveal their strive and management level to each other , vary with the quality of government management in evaluating projects. The model provides with decision - making gist in second and later stage syndications public-private partnerships.