期刊文献+

董事会治理风险预警研究——COX模型的构建 被引量:5

Research on Risk Precaution for Board Governance——Based on COX Model
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摘要 在双层委托代理关系下,董事会治理是公司治理的核心,而董事会治理的重心在于风险预警及防范。本文提出两个核心概念——公司治理风险及董事会治理风险,在此基础上构建了董事会风险评价指标体系,并利用COX模型分析机理,设计了董事会治理风险预警模型。 Commissioned in double agent,the board governance is at the core of corporate governance,and the board is the focus of risk management precaution and prevention.This paper presents two core concepts:corporate governance risks and risk management board,and on that basis the board of the risk evaluation index system,and design the risk warning model of board governance by COX model process.
出处 《山西财经大学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2010年第4期76-84,共9页 Journal of Shanxi University of Finance and Economics
基金 教育部人文社科重点课题项目(05JD630109)资助
关键词 公司治理风险 董事会治理风险 风险预警 COX模型 corporate governance risk board governance risk risk precaution cox model
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参考文献21

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