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委托-代理关系的数学描述及应用分析 被引量:1

Mathematical Description and Application Analysis of Principal-Agent Relationship
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摘要 委托-代理关系是不同变量之间的一种复杂函数关系.文中运用状态空间模型化(State-Space Formulation)方法对其基本模型和一般性的分析框架进行了描述,并借助Kuhn-Tucker理论对其解进行了分析.同时,以农村合作金融为例,阐述了委托-代理理论在实际中的应用.研究表明,政府与农村合作金融组织之间的风险分担机制的设定,要考虑农村合作金融组织负责人的道德风险问题与各种不确定性因素所造成的影响.通过运用委托-代理理论对这些不同个体之间的契约关系进行分析,可以为我们对这些问题的理解提供一个工具. This paper deals with the principal-agent relationship, a complex function representing the relationship among different variables, and introduces the State-Space Formulation method to demonstrate its basic model and general framework. With the help of Kuhn-Tucker theory, the solution to the model is then analyzed. Afterwards, with the rural cooperative finance as an example, the application of principal-agent theory is discussed. It is con- cluded that, in the setting of risk-sharing mechanism between government and the person in charge of rural coopera- tive finance organization, the moral hazard of the person in charge and various uncertainties should be fully consi- dered. The principal-agent theory is effective in analyzing the contract relationship among different individuals and provides an approach to understanding the contract relationship.
作者 邓泽辉
出处 《华南理工大学学报(自然科学版)》 EI CAS CSCD 北大核心 2010年第3期156-161,共6页 Journal of South China University of Technology(Natural Science Edition)
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(B5126214) 广东省社会科学重点研究基地重大项目(08JDXM79007)
关键词 委托-代理模型 拉格朗日方法 Kuhn-Tucker理论 农村信用社 principal-agent model Lagrange method Kuhn-Tucker theory rural credit cooperative
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参考文献9

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共引文献32

同被引文献15

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